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Abstract
The degree of intergenerational altruism is estimated in a benchmark Barro-type OLG frame-
work with imperfect altruism, exploiting the exogenous variation generated by reforms of the
tax treatment of bequests and inter vivos real estate donations enacted in Italy between 2000
and 2001. Using longitudinal information on the housing stock and house prices in 13 large
Italian cities between 1993 and 2004, the structural parameter of interest is estimated via the
effect of the reform on house prices. We estimate a degree of intergenerational altruism ranging
between 0.2 and 0.3, a magnitude consistent with existing parametrization for the US economy.
This suggests that intergenerational altruism may be similar across advanced economies.
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1 Introduction
The degree of intergenerational altruism is a key parameter in dynamic models with overlapping
generations, a framework that is widely used in macroeconomics to analyze a variety of questions
such as fiscal policy, taxation, and social security. However, only a few estimates of such parameter
exist, and they are typically based on incidental indirect inference conducted in the course of
calibration exercises for the US economy (e.g., Han and Mulligan, 2001, Nishiyama, 2002, and
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Barczyk, 2016). No direct empirical evidence has been brought to bear on estimation of this
parameter, nor are estimates for continental European countries available.
This paper provides a direct, structural estimate of the degree of intergenerational altruism in
a Barro-type model (Barro, 1974) for Italy. Although different bequest motives (e.g., intergener-
ational altruism, exchange, strategic behavior) have been emphasized in the literature, we focus
here on imperfect altruism a` la Barro because of its conceptual simplicity and relevance in quan-
titative macroeconomic applications. We exploit the exogenous variation generated by reforms
of inheritance taxation (estate tax, in the US) and taxes on inter vivos donations (gift tax, in the
US), henceforth “bequest tax”,1 that occurred in Italy between 2000 and 2001. This variation is
exogenous (which greatly facilitates identification) because it is generated by tax reforms moti-
vated by the 2001 electoral contest in Italy. We identify a degree of intergenerational altruism of
between 0.2 and 0.3. This estimate refers to a large European country, is a direct counterpart of
the existing estimates based on US data, and agrees by and large with the latter, suggesting that
intergenerational altruism may be similar across advanced economies.
Besides providing a structural estimate of an important parameter for a large European coun-
try (certainly the first for Italy), this paper makes a number of contributions of general interest.
First, our estimate is obtained in a general equilibrium setting exploiting the relationship between
real estate (asset) prices, the change in bequest taxation, and bequest behavior emerging from the
model. This approach connects the asset pricing perspective and the estimation of intergenerational
altruism in a novel fashion. Second, and most important, we adopt a quasi-experimental method,
exploiting an exogenous change of the bequest tax parameter fully leveraging the uniqueness of the
Italian case. Such cases are uncommon and quite valuable; as Poterba (2001) puts it: “searching
for additional sources of plausibly exogenous variation in the tax rates on gifts and bequests, and
using such variation to study the elasticity of gift-giving, is a natural direction for further work”
(p. 263). To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first contribution to follow up on this
suggestion in estimating one of the crucial determinants of gift-giving: intergenerational altruism.
Finally, from a methodological viewpoint, we combine the pros of structural methods, calibration,
and the quasi-experimental approach. These different empirical methods are often contrasted, but
they can fit together quite well.
The quasi-experiment we exploit is the following. Until year 2000 the tax rate on bequests
and donations in Italy had a progressive structure, as reported in Table 1, and was particularly
unpopular. On October 13, 1999 the Italian Parliament rejected a bill, proposed by the conservative
opposition leader Silvio Berlusconi, which aimed at repealing the tax. With a general election
looming ahead in the Spring of 2001, the move of the opposition leader was clearly part of an
early electoral campaign. As a consequence, the incumbent government was forced to act and
1 Inheritance and gift taxes are often unified to prevent the use of donations as a mean to avoid the inheritance tax.
2
reform the tax: two weeks later, the Finance Minister Vincenzo Visco announced that a reform of
the inheritance and gift tax would be implemented “at the soonest, and in such a way that the tax
rate will be single-digit”. The government pushed through the Italian Parliament a reform as soon
as the following month (December 1999), during the approval of the 2000 budget. This reform
introduced a flat rate of 4% and increased the exemption threshold, and became effective at the end
of 2000. The complete abolition of the inheritance and gift tax became a major issue in the political
platform of the conservative coalition for the 2001 general election. In June 2001, only one month
after the elections, the new government led by Silvio Berlusconi repealed the tax. Later on, in
2006, bequest taxation was reintroduced by the new center-left government led by Romano Prodi,
at the same 2001 flat rate, but with such a high exemption threshold to make the tax immaterial.
Table 1: Bequest tax rates in Italy when the grantee is a spouse or direct relative
Legal reference Tax base Bracket Rate (%)
Law 346/1990 Total estate 0–125K 0
125K–175K 3
175K–250K 7
250K–400K 10
400K–750K 15
750K–1500K 22
>1500K 27
Law 342/2000 Estate per recipient 0–175K 0
>175K 4
Law 383/2001 Any amount 0
Notes: The table reports the bequest and inter-vivos donation tax rates in Italy before and after the 2000 and 2001
reforms. These rates refer to the case of a grantee who is either a spouse or a direct relative of the deceased or the
donor. Rates for all other individuals are higher, see Jappelli et al. (2014) for more details.
In order to exploit these events and provide a structural estimate of the intergenerational altru-
ism parameter, we built a unique panel data set using a variety of sources. The data set includes
information on house prices, the housing stock, and non-housing consumption for the 13 largest
cities in Italy over the period 1993-2004. The empirical investigation is based on a stylized OLG
model in which individuals may either sell their assets or donate them to their offspring. The model
formalizes a mechanism through which the bequest tax affects market (i.e., sales) and non-market
(i.e., donations) real estate transactions, and the dynamics of house prices.
The key implication of the model for the purpose of identifying the parameter of interest is that,
ceteris paribus, house prices respond to changes in the bequest tax rate if and only if the degree
of intergenerational altruism is different from zero. Intuitively, a lower bequest tax rate makes
asset donations more attractive to an altruistic parent, relative to liquidating the asset for own con-
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sumption purposes. Therefore, lowering bequest taxation drives up the shadow value of housing,
thus increasing house prices and donations.2 The effects of bequest taxation on asset prices is not
limited to housing. However, because of data availability and because of the special relevance of
housing in intergenerational transfers, this asset is a natural target for structural estimation.
Heuristic evidence consistent with this economic mechanism is reported in Figure 1, which
shows sales and donations per household, as well as the mean bequest tax rate and house prices
in Italy between 1993 and 2004. When the bequest tax rate was sharply reduced, the number of
donations per household increased almost threefold, to unprecedented levels, sales slowed down,
and prices increased.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the model is built in Section 2, and it is
first calibrated and then estimated in Section 3; Section 4 concludes.
Figure 1: Bequest tax rate, house prices, house donations, and house sales in Italy, 1993–2004.
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Notes: The figure shows the time series of the mean bequest tax rate, house donations and house sales per household
in Italy between 1993 and 2004. The mean tax rate is computed as the weighted average across the different tax
brackets in Table 1, using the empirical distribution of house prices reported in the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Income
Household and Wealth (missing values are interpolated). The price series is real and is represented on a log scale, in
deviation from the minimum (11.388) and divided by 10 to fit in the picture (right scale). Other sources: NOMISMA
for house prices, Italian Ministry of the Economy for donations and sales.
2 The distortionary effects of bequest taxation in the US have been investigated, among others, by Holtz-Eakin
and Marples (2001), Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001), and Joulfaian (2006). The optimal structure of bequest taxation, a
question that we do not address in this paper, has been studied by Farhi and Werning (2010). A baseline result is that
in a model with a fictitious dynastic agent like the one we employ here, a zero bequest tax rate is optimal. Kopczuk
(2009) provides an overview of theory and evidence.
3 In a companion paper to this one (Bellettini, Taddei, and Zanella, 2013) we perform a reduced-form regression
analysis to estimate the effect of the tax reform on house sales and donations.
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2 The model
Our investigation is framed within a simple Barro-type model with imperfect altruism, augmented
with a stylized housing sector. This is a natural benchmark for studying intergeneration altruism in
relation to bequest taxes and house prices. Obviously this approach makes our estimate completely
model-dependent, as is typically the case in structural estimation. Most important, this modeling
choice restricts the form of the bequest motive in a non-trivial way, to the simplest formulation we
can envision. This is intentional: by putting aside more sophisticated motives and more general
forms of altruism we are giving the benchmark model a chance to reproduce in a transparent way
the price dynamics and to provide an estimate of the altruism parameter that is in the ballpark of
existing estimates based on more sophisticated models.
2.1 Setup
Consider a production economy with overlapping generations indexed by j = 1,2, .... These are
sets of individuals of unit measure living for three periods, each period being composed of 30 years.
During the first period (age 0-30, period 0), generation j is inactive, is part of the older generation’s
household, and has no choices to make (so, effectively, there are only two periods in the model);
during the intermediate period (age 31-60, period 1) generation j is referred to as “young”, it
supplies inelastically one unit of labor, consumes c1 j units of a non-durable consumption good,
and has children; in the final period (age 61-90, period 2) generation j is referred to as “old”, it is
retired, consumes c2 j units of the consumption good, donates (possibly), and dies. In addition to
these goods, each generation chooses, in period 1, how much housing stock, H j, to hold during the
active lifetime. The preferences of generation j are represented by
ϒ j =U j(.)+βρϒ j+1, (1)
where
U j = u(c1 j)+βu(c2 j)+ v(H j), (2)
and where u(·) and v(·) denote the utility derived from consumption of non-durable goods and
housing, respectively, β is a time preference factor, and ρ is the degree of intergenerational altru-
ism. We assume u′, v′ > 0, u′′, v′′ < 0, β ∈ [0,1], and ρ ∈ [0,1]. Although we could treat housing
like any other asset, we believe there are good reasons for having it in the utility function: this
special asset is both a way of transferring wealth across time (and so across generations), and the
source of a valuable good—housing services.
Notice that β is a 30-year discount factor: within a generation, the distance between period
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1 and period 2 is 30 years, and across generations the distance between period 2 of generation j
and the active life span (periods 1 and 2) of generation j+ 1 is also 30 years. This is a standard
interpretation of OLG models that is used to express parameters at the appropriate frequencies
(see, for instance, Nishiyama 2002). We will later refer to this interpretation when scaling back at
the model (generational) frequencies the structural parameter of interest estimated at the different
data (yearly) frequencies.
When young, individuals split their wealth (labor income plus after-tax bequests and donations
received in the form of housing and non-housing transfers) between current consumption, non-
housing assets, purchase of existing houses and investment in new houses. When old, individuals
split their wealth (savings and housing wealth) between consumption, and bequests and donations
of either housing or the consumption good (the numeraire) to the following generation. Notice
that bequests and donations are indistinguishable in this model (only the old can donate, to the
young) and they both occur during the final period of a generation’s life. In what follows we adopt
the following convention, an innocuous abuse of notation that allows us to economize on words:
we will refer to “period j” as the period when generation j is young, and to “period j+1” as the
period when generation j is old (and so generation j+1 is young). The period budget constraints
are:
c1 j = w j− s j + p j[(1− τ)Hdonj−1−Husedj ]+ (1− τ)D j−1− iHj ; (3)
c2 j = s jR j+1+ p j+1Hsalej −D j, (4)
where w j is labor income, s j savings, R j+1 the interest factor (one plus the interest rate), p j the
price of a unit of the housing stock, Hdonj−1 the amount of housing that generation j receives from
generation j− 1, Husedj the amount of existing (“used”) housing units held by generation j in
period j, Hsalej the amount of existing housing units sold by generation j when old in period j+1,
iHj generation j’s investment in new housing units, and D j the amount of the consumption good
donated by generation j to generation j+1 (i.e., the liquid asset). The government levies a bequest
tax on intergenerational transfers: bequests or donations of either housing or the numeraire from
the old to the young are taxed at rate τ ∈ [0,1]. The tax revenue ends up outside the model.
Notice how equation (3) is constructed: Husedj is the number of existing (“used”) housing units
that generation j acquires in period j via both market transactions and non-market intergenerational
transfers. Therefore, generation j must satisfy the following, additional “accounting” constraints
on housing:
Husedj ≤ Hsalej−1 +Hdonj−1 (5)
H j(1−δ ) ≥ Hsalej +Hdonj , (6)
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where δ is the depreciation rate of the housing stock held by generation j. Inequality (5) means that
consumption of housing by generation j cannot exceed the sum of what is acquired via market and
non-market transactions; inequality (6) means that that generation j decides, when old in period
j+1, how to allocate its depreciated stock of housing, H j(1−δ ), between donation to generation
j+1 and resale on the market.
There are two production functions; one for houses, which uses non-durable goods as the only
input and which exhibits decreasing returns,
Hnewj = f (i
H
j ), with f
′ > 0, f ′′ < 0, (7)
where Hnewj is the supply of newly produced housing units as a function of generation j investment
in housing, iHj ; and one for the non-durable good itself, which uses non-housing capital and labor
as inputs, and which exhibits the usual properties of aggregate production functions,
y j = g(k j),
g′ > 0, g′′ < 0,
(8)
where y j and k j are output and non-housing capital per worker, respectively, in period j. We
assume that the new housing units produced by one generation become part of the housing stock
of that same generation. Non-housing capital (capital, for brevity) is created at no cost from the
period j consumption good, and is employed to produce consumption goods at j+1. We assume
that capital fully depreciates in one period, so the law of motion of the per worker capital stock is
k j+1 = i j, (9)
where i j is per worker investment in non-housing capital in period j. As usual, output is split
between households and the government. The bequest tax is the only source of government revenue
in this economy. We impose the additional constraints Hdonj ≥ 0 and D j ≥ 0 (i.e., bequests cannot
be negative) and focus, in what follows, on the interior optimum for all of the choice variables.4 In
order to keep the empirical analysis simple and transparent, we also assume perfect forecast about
future house prices.
2.2 Equilibrium
Definition 1 (Competitive equilibrium). The competitive equilibrium is a vector (c1 j, c2 j, i j, iHj ,
H j, Hsalej , H
don
j , H
used
j , D j) such that, given the price vector (p j, R j+1, w j):
4 This assumption is justified by the empirical goal of the paper: our representative agent is always at an interior in
our data set.
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(i) Agents optimize:
(c1 j,c2 j, i j, iHj ,H j,H
sale
j ,H
don
j ,H
used
j ,D j) ∈ argmaxϒ js.t. (3), (4), (5), (6), ∀ j. (10)
(ii) The goods market clears:
c1 j + c2 j−1+ iHj + i j + τ(p jH
don
j−1+D j−1) = g(k j). (11)
(iii) The housing market clears:
H j = Husedj +H
new
j . (12)
(iv) The capital market clears:
k j+1 = s j. (13)
Notice that in equilibrium both (5) and (6) are binding—no valuable housing stock goes wasted,
except because of depreciation. Combining these two and (12) we obtain the dynamic equation
that describes the evolution of the housing stock:
H j = H j−1(1−δ )+ f
(
iHj
)
. (14)
It is easy to show that this equilibrium is self-consistent. Denoting the tax revenue by Tj ≡
τ(p jHdonj−1+D j−1) and using (11), we have:
c1 j + iHj +Tj + i j = g(k j)− c2 j−1. (15)
Using equation (4), this yields:
s j−1R j = g(k j)−w j = c2 j−1+D j−1− p jHsalej−1 , (16)
so that equation (15) becomes:
i j = w j +D j−1− p jHsalej−1− c1 j− iHj −Tj. (17)
Substituting for (9), we obtain:
k j+1 = w j− c1 j +D j−1− p jHsalej−1− iHj − τ(p jHdonj−1+D j−1), (18)
and so, by (3) and (5), k j+1 = s j, which completes the description of the model.
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2.3 House prices
Solving the maximization problem for generation j and substituting the first-order conditions for
Husedj and H
sale
j into the one for H j we obtain:
v′(H j) = p ju′(c1 j)− p j+1βu′(c2 j)(1−δ ). (19)
This equation has a very simple interpretation: it states that generation j equalizes the marginal
benefit of consuming an additional unit of housing (LHS of the equation) to its marginal cost
(RHS), where the latter is given by the difference between the utility-weighted cost of purchasing
housing, p ju′(c1 j), and the utility-weighted benefit of reselling it when old, net of depreciation,
p j+1βu′(c2 j)(1− δ ). A similar equation can be derived with respect to the optimal amount of
donations, by substituting the first-order conditions for Hdonj into the one for H j:
v′(H j) = p ju′(c1 j)− p j+1βρ(1− τ)(1−δ )u′(c1 j+1). (20)
Equation (20) can be interpreted as the equality between the marginal benefit of consuming an
additional unit of housing (LHS) and its marginal cost (RHS), measured by the difference between
the utility-weighted cost of purchasing housing (first term on the RHS) and the utility-weighted
benefit of donating it to generation j + 1 net of taxation and depreciation (second term on the
RHS).
Taking equations (19) and (20) together, it is easy to see that at the competitive equilibrium
the old generation will choose levels of consumption and donations so that its marginal utility
equates the marginal utility of consumption of the following generation, weighted by the degree of
intergenerational altruism, and after netting out the effect of bequest taxation:
u′(c2 j) = ρ(1− τ)u′(c1 j+1). (21)
Combining equation (21) with the first-order condition for optimal savings s j,
u′(c1 j) = βR j+1u′(c2 j), (22)
we obtain:
u′(c1 j)
u′(c1 j+1)
= βρ(1− τ)R j+1. (23)
Equation (23) summarizes the dynamic behavior of the economy. Since R j+1 > 1 and βρ(1−
τ) 6 1, the right-hand side could be greater, equal or smaller than 1. If βρ(1− τ)R j+1 > 1 then
consumption of the young increases from one generation to the next. If instead βρ(1−τ)R j+1 < 1
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then consumption of the young decreases from one generation to the next. We assume the economy
is at its steady state, which is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Steady state). For all j,
c1 j = c1 j+1 = c1, (24)
c2 j = c2 j+1 = c2, (25)
H j = H. (26)
Since R j+1 is an endogenous price, in the steady state it must adjust so that u′(c1 j) = u′(c1 j+1).
By replacing this condition into (23), we obtain:
R =
1
βρ(1− τ) . (27)
Combining this equation with (19) and (22), we obtain the key steady-state asset price equation
for the housing stock:
p =
v′(H)
u′(c1)[1−βρ(1−δ )(1− τ)] , (28)
This asset price equation can be used in combination with the first-order conditions for iHj and
Husedj to determine the steady state level of housing investment, i
H . The latter solves
p =
1
f ′(iH)
. (29)
The steady-state effect of changes in the bequest tax rate τ is characterized by the following
proposition and its corollary.
Proposition 1 (Effect of bequest taxes on steady-state house prices). If ρ > 0 and if a lower interest
rate does not induce lower consumption in the first period of the life cycle, then the steady-state
house price, p, increases as the tax rate on bequests, τ , decreases.
Proof. Rewriting (28) as
pu′(c1)
v′(H)
=
1
[1−βρ(1− τ)(1−δ )] , (30)
we see that when τ decreases, pu′(c1)/v′(H) must increase for this equation to be satisfied. By
equation (27), a decrease in τ decreases R. Suppose a lower R increases c1 (and so decreases
u′(c1)). Because u′(c1) decreases, the p/v′(H) ratio must increase. Suppose p does not change.
Then v′(H) decreases, which means that H increases, because v(·) is concave. But by (14) this is
possible only if iH also increases. Then f ′(iH) must decrease and, by (29), p increases, contra-
dicting the assumption that p does not change. Now suppose that p decreases. Then v′(H) must
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decrease even faster, which means that H increases. But this yields a contradiction too, because by
(29) p must then increase. Therefore, p must increase.
Corollary 1 (Effect of bequest taxes on steady-state housing investment and stock). Under the
same conditions of Proposition 1, as the tax rate on bequests, τ , decreases, residential investment
and the housing stock increase.
Proof. Follows directly from equation (29).
Proposition 1 has a straightforward economic interpretation. For the old, the housing stock can
be employed in two ways: it can either be sold on the market or it can be transferred directly to
the next generation, net of the ad valorem transfer tax. When the tax rate is reduced, there are
two effects. First, standard income and substitution effects. These work in the same direction,
bringing about an increase in donations and house prices. Second, a general equilibrium effect via
the interest rate. A lower bequest tax rate requires, in equilibrium, a lower interest rate because
one must be indifferent (after factoring in ρ) between donating assets and saving (a “no arbitrage”
requirement, see equation 27). However, since in the first period an individual is a net saver, the
effect of a higher interest rate on period 1 consumption—and so on donations—is ambiguous. If,
in response to the general equilibrium effect (lower R), period 1 consumption increases, then house
prices unambiguously increase.5
3 Empirical analysis
The empirical analysis consists of a preliminary calibration exercise as a check on the model’s
ability to replicate house price dynamics at the city level, and then structural estimation of inter-
generational altruism in such a model. The starting point is the annual analog of equation (28):
pt =
v′(Ht)
u′(c1t) [1−βρ(1−δ )(1− τt)] , (31)
where t indexes years. Notice the difference between the time index t and the generation index j:
equation (28) represents the steady state, and is derived from a model cast at low (generational)
frequencies, while equation (31) represents the same steady state at higher (annual) frequencies,
and is used to conduct our empirical investigation. This difference is dictated by data availability, as
we cannot observe house prices, the housing stock, and consumption of the young one generation
ahead, as would be needed to estimate the transitional dynamics. This data constraint challenges
5 Notice that, a fortiori, this result would still hold if we had assumed a small open economy where the relevant
interest rate is the (exogenous) world rate of return on savings. In this case, too, an increase in house prices is needed
to restore the equality between the return on housing and the fixed return on capital holdings.
11
inference on ρ based on equation (31) only if following the tax change the economy does not
jump to the new steady state. The speed of convergence is entirely an empirical matter. The
calibration exercise performed below suggests that, in fact, convergence to the new steady state
takes place fast, which justifies the use of the steady-state equation for our empirical analysis.
To put it another way, suppose that the model is true but it took a long time to reach the new
steady state. Then only the equation describing the transitional dynamics would have a chance in
replicating the annual data in a calibration exercise. As it turns out, the steady state equation does
a good job at replicating the data. This implies that the economy (when interpreted through the
lenses of the model) is not far from the steady state,6 and so the steady state equation provides a fair
approximation of the behavior of the economy for an empirical analysis at the annual frequency.
That is, the fit produced by the calibration exercise justifies, ex-post, the use of the steady state
equation. The only caveat, as pointed out in Section 2.1, is that the parameter we estimate at the
yearly frequencies must be rescaled on a 30-year basis (half the active life span in the model) to be
interpreted at the lower, generational frequencies of the model.
3.1 Data set
We collected data from a variety of sources, which we use to construct a city-level panel data set
for the period 1993-2004. City-level real estate prices, market transactions, and residential stocks
come from the NOMISMA data base, a proprietary archive. This data base contains average prices
of new and used residential units per square meter. We focus on the price of a used unit of average
size (this is the notion of residential unit that is consistent with the model), where average size
is taken from the 2001 Italian Census. Data on donations were provided by the Italian Ministry
of the Economy. We use the Bank of Italy’s Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW)
to estimate non-housing consumption. This is defined as total household expenditure in durables
and non-durables, excluding rents and maintenance expenses.7 House prices and non-housing
consumption are deflated using the CPI, and are expressed in constant 1993 euros. Table 2 contains
key summary statistics from our sample.
6 An alternative explanation of this empirical fact is that agents don’t have rational expectations.
7 Consumption data is also available in the much larger Household Consumption Expenditure survey maintained
by ISTAT, the Italian Statistical Office. However, the publicly available version of these data do not allow us to identify
the consumption aggregate that is relevant in the model: consumption of households whose head is between 31 and 60
years of age.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
2001 1993-1998 1999-2004
Size Pop Stock Price Sales Don’s Pop Stock Price Sales Don’s
Bari 88.7 333.3 132.8 87.0 1.869 1.666 320.7 152.7 87.9 2.506 2.455
Bologna 83.7 379.2 188.7 120.4 5.148 0.492 372.3 206.4 129.4 7.241 0.827
Cagliari 98.1 178.1 63.6 89.6 0.687 0.749 165.9 83.4 86.3 0.975 1.130
Catania 83.4 325.0 139.6 61.8 1.747 1.358 312.9 159.3 61.0 2.018 1.950
Florence 89.1 383.1 152.6 131.0 4.867 0.498 360.6 176.6 147.7 5.765 0.860
Genoa 81.9 651.1 288.4 82.1 8.904 0.418 613.1 318.7 73.2 12.055 0.763
Milan 79.1 1314.1 701.3 131.3 22.399 3.261 1263.4 736.7 149.5 33.140 4.800
Naples 79.1 1036.6 377.0 84.4 3.389 2.922 1006.7 404.0 91.6 5.567 4.238
Padua 103.3 208.6 90.1 103.8 2.897 0.816 205.9 106.1 108.6 3.893 1.263
Palermo 93.8 697.9 283.7 70.0 3.909 1.395 688.3 302.5 70.0 2.718 1.976
Rome 84.3 2665.6 1189.9 122.1 20.070 2.429 2557.6 1248.6 127.4 37.566 3.874
Turin 76.2 929.4 439.9 83.6 22.188 1.216 872.4 477.9 82.9 27.258 1.861
Venice 87.7 296.2 110.3 102.4 5.218 0.624 274.3 134.0 124.9 4.998 0.876
Notes: The table reports, in the first column, the average size of housing units in 2001 (source: 2001 Italian Census);
the remaining columns contain population and annual averages of stocks, prices, and transactions in two periods:
1993-1998 and 1999-2004. Legend: Pop = city population; Stock = housing units; Price: price of a used housing
unit of average size, in thousands of constant 1993 euros; Sales = number of market transactions; Don’s = number of
non-market transactions (donations). All figures except size are in thousands.
3.2 Calibration
The goal of the calibration exercise is to replicate the observed price series in the sample using the
asset price equation (31). Notice that this is enough to check the consistency between the model
and the data because this equation subsumes all of the other first-order conditions as well. It turns
out that the model-based steady state relationship provides a good fit of the annual time series.
Incidentally, by focusing on prices, the calibration exercise produces a model-based estimate of
the effect of the reform on house prices, which be briefly comment below.
Taking logs, we can write condition (31) as:
ln pt = ln
v′(Ht)
u′(c1t)
− ln[1−βρ(1−δ )(1− τt)]. (32)
Taking a first-order Taylor expansion of the utility function around the steady state of the cur-
rent cohort, (H∗,c∗1),
8 or, equivalently, assuming directly a log specification for the utility function
8 One can express marginal utility as
v′(Ht)≈ v
′(H∗)H∗
Ht
; u′(c1t)≈ u
′(c∗1)c
∗
1
c1t
,
and α ≡ ln[v′(H∗)H∗]− ln[u′(c∗1)c∗1] in equation (32). These expression follow from the fact that, for any function
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in (2),9 we can rewrite (32) as
ln pt = lnc1t− lnHt +α− ln[1−βρ(1−δ )(1− τt)], (33)
where α is an unobserved city effect. For the purposes of calibration, we use the first-differenced
version of equation (33) to eliminate the city effect:
∆ ln pit = ∆ lnc1,it−∆ lnHit−∆ ln[1−βρ(1−δ )(1− τt)]. (34)
We calibrate the model parameters as follows. First, for the annual discount factor we set
β = 0.96. Second, we set δ = 0.0275. This value is taken from Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans
(2007), who estimate from the American Housing Survey that the housing stock depreciates at
between 2.5% and 3% per year in the US.
Third, to calibrate ρ we draw from the studies mentioned in the Introduction. In Nishiyama
(2002) adult life lasts 60 years like in our model, and he obtains ρ = 0.512 when the coefficient of
relative risk aversion is set equal to 2 and ρ = 0.388 when this coefficient is equal to 4. Han and
Mulligan’s (2001) estimate is ρ = 0.295, and Barczyk’s (2016) is ρ = 0.280 for the old household
that is the counterpart of the old household in our model. The average of these estimates is 0.368,
implying a value of 0.967 at an annual frequency (i.e., 0.3681/30). These values imply βρ(1−δ ) =
0.928 for yearly data.
Fourth, we need to estimate the relevant bequest tax rate, τ . In the model, this is the rate applied
to the value of the marginal housing unit that is transferred to the young generation. We assume
that this marginal housing unit is equal to the average housing unit (i.e., there is no selectivity
inducing systematic differences between those housing units that are donated to one’s offspring
and those that are not). Under this assumption, τ can be computed as a weighted average across
the different tax brackets reported in Table 1, using the frequencies from the empirical distribution
of house prices as weights. Such empirical distribution is taken from the 2000 cross-section of the
SHIW (pre-reform values) in order to keep weights constant. The result is an average tax rate of
1.97% until 1999, 0.46% in 2000, and 0% from 2001 to 2004.10
f (x) and approximation point x∗,
f (x)≈ f (x∗)+ f ′(x∗)(x− x∗) = f (x∗)+ f ′(x∗)x∗(lnx− lnx∗)⇒ f ′(x)≈ f
′(x∗)x∗
x
9 Notice that such an approximation or its equivalent parametric assumption implicitly pick a special case among
those considered in Proposition 1, namely the case in which “a lower interest rate does not affect consumption in the
first period”.
10 The rates in Table 1 refer to inheritances by and donations to one’s spouse and direct relatives, which cover
virtually all cases.
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Fifth, a young household is defined as a household whose head is between 31 and 60 years old,
and from the SHIW, we compute mean non-housing consumption for these households, c1. This is
defined as total household expenditure in durables and non-durables, excluding rents (actual and
imputed) and maintenance expenses (ordinary and extraordinary).11 Unfortunately, the lowest level
of aggregation at which information in the SHIW is publicly released is the region.12 The best we
can do is to attribute to each city the average household consumption of the region where the city
is located. Presumably, this procedure leads to underestimation of the level of city consumption
because income and consumption expenditure are lower is non-urban areas. However, it is not
obvious that the resulting growth rate is also biased.
Finally, H is measured by the number of housing units (the housing stock) at the city level,
as estimated at the annual frequency by ISTAT, the Italian Statistical Office. The housing stock
is missing for years prior to 2000, and missing values are predicted using the coefficients from a
linear projection of the housing stock on city population, city dummies, and a linear time trend for
the period 2000-2012.
We simulate the model from 1995 onward, because the fit is poor in 1993 and 1994. The result
of the exercise is reported in Figure 2. This figure shows three different price series. First, the
data. Second, the series generated by equation (34). Third, the counterfactual series generated by
this equation when the tax rate is left unchanged at the pre-2000 level. Notice that in the model
prices adjust immediately. Therefore, in Figure 2 changes in the bequest tax rate have a permanent
level effect and a transitory growth effect in 2000 and 2001. Considering that we are using a
very parsimonious theory, the model reproduces the data fairly well. In particular, we are able to
reproduce the turning point in the price series quite accurately in most cities. The only exceptions
are Venice and Genoa. The model with tax changes clearly outperforms the counterfactual with an
unaltered bequest tax: the distance between model and data, measured in mean square differences
across cities, is 0.023 and 0.062, respectively.
The difference between the model’s prediction with the actual tax change and the counterfac-
tual prediction when the tax rate is held constant at the pre-2000 level is a model-based estimate
of the effect of the tax reduction. As shown in Table 3, this difference is 12.7% in 2000 and 4.1%
in 2001. Because the tax reduction was 1.514 and 0.458 percentage points, respectively, these
numbers correspond to a semi-elasticity of about 8%. This is admittedly a large number. It means
that a 1 percentage point reduction of the average (weighted) bequest tax induces a 8% increase in
house prices. In a companion paper to this one (Bellettini, Taddei, and Zanella, 2013), we conduct
an event study of the reforms and produce a reduced-form estimates of about 5%, corresponding to
11 Sampling weights are applied. The frequency of the SHIW is biennial, with the exception of a two-year lag
between 1995 and 1998. All missing years are interpolated linearly.
12 There are 20 administrative regions in Italy.
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Figure 2: House prices: actual and generated by calibrated asset price equation
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Notes: The figure compares the house price data with two model generated-series: the first is generated by the model
when we consider the actual tax changes; the second is generated by the model in the counterfactual situation of no
tax changes during the 1993–2004 period.
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a semi-elasticity of about 2.5%. This is much smaller than the model-based effect. In interpreting
the latter, however, one must keep in mind that there are no frictions in the model—prices adjust
immediately. In reality, housing market frictions are likely to attenuate this impact effect. There-
fore, a way of interpreting the discrepancy between the model-based (8%) and the reduced-form
(2.5%) semi-elasticity of house prices to the bequest tax rate is that frictions (either optimization
frictions or market frictions strictly defined, or both) are possibly important during the adjustment
to a new tax regime. Given the model’s ability to replicate the data fairly well, we turn to structural
estimation of the main parameter of interest, ρ , in this model.
Table 3: Average variation in house prices in 2000 and 2001
2000 2001
(a) Data 0.049 0.046
(b) Model, with tax change 0.085 0.033
(c) Model, no tax change –0.042 –0.008
Difference ((b) – (c)) 0.127 0.041
Notes: The table reports the cross-city average of ∆ ln pit in 2000 and 2001. In these years the bequest tax rate was
reduced, which implies a transitory growth effect in the two years. The difference between the average variation in the
model and the corresponding variation when the tax rate is held constant (i.e., (b)–(c)) is a model-based estimate of
the effect of the reduction in bequest taxation on house prices.
3.3 Identification and structural estimation
Equation (33) can be estimated on our panel introducing a cross-sectional dimension (i), and an
error term representing random shocks to preferences, or technology, or both (εit):
ln pit = αi− ln[1−βρ(1−δ )(1− τt)]− lnHit + lnc1,it + εit . (35)
This is a constrained, nonlinear regression with coefficients on lnHit and lnc1,it set equal to−1
and 1, respectively, which is equivalent to estimating the following equation,
ln(pitHit/c1,it) = αi− ln[1−βρ(1−δ )(1− τt)]+ εit , (36)
a specification in which the dependent variable is the log of the ratio of housing consumption to
non-housing consumption. Notice that the tax rate varies over time only, not across cities. There-
fore, the city effect αi is uncorrelated with τt and must be treated as a random effect. Specification
(36) is, of course, the direct empirical counterpart of the model’s first-order conditions. That is,
we estimate the asset pricing equation as produced by the model, without engaging in any explicit
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or implicit “specification search”. Because the only time-varying variable on the RHS (besides the
error term) is the bequest tax rate, the credibility of our identification rests upon the credibility of
the exogenous nature of the tax reforms we are considering. As discussed in Section 1, the reforms
were motivated by the electoral competition and so it is reasonable to assume that they were ex-
ogenous with respect to asset prices. If one believes this identifying assumption, then there are no
identification issues under specification (36), provided one takes care of serial correlation in the
panel. In other words, all factors affecting house prices during the period under investigation (e.g.,
time trends, demographic changes, secular changes in demand or supply of housing, changes in
real interest rates, etc.) are already factored into Equation (36), either in the error term (which is
uncorrelated with τt) or in the Hit/c1,it term. The latter, in particular, captures intertemporal factors
affecting house prices. Nonetheless, in order to provide a more conservative estimate, we employ
as a robustness check specifications where flexible, city-specific quadratic or quartic trends are
added to equation (36). The resulting estimate of ρ will be less tight because of the large number
of additional parameters to be estimated, but this provides a check against other possible time-
varying determinants of house prices not fully captured by the housing-to-consumption ratio, for
instance because the latter is measured with error.
Even after performing such a robustness check, a residual source of concern may be the follow-
ing. Suppose that, in reality, ρ = 0 and there are unobserved (or simply unaccounted for) events at
the national level that occurred exactly at the same time as the bequest tax reform, and that affected
house prices in the same direction as the model predicts the tax change would when ρ > 0. In this
case, because our identification is effectively based on a before-after comparison in a time series
setting, our estimate would be misleading.13
In the absence of a control group (the reform affected all Italian cities equally), some evidence
limiting this concern comes from the companion paper to this one. Bellettini, Taddei, and Zanella
(2013) shows in a reduced-form regression framework that the reform increased donations and
reduced sales between 2001 and 2004, as predicted by the model. Although not conclusive, this
evidence corroborates the claim that the effect we identify is, in fact, driven by a change in τt and
not some unobserved variable. While possible, it strains credibility that a one-time, permanent
change in some other variable that was relevant for house prices took place at exactly the same
time as the tax reform and was also altering the value of donations. If relevant, such an event
would not have gone unnoticed.
The Non-linear Least Squares (NLS) estimation of equation (36) identifies the composite struc-
tural parameter βρ(1− δ ). The latter, in turn, for plausible values of the depreciation rate δ and
the intertemporal discount factor β , allows us to recover a range of plausible values for the struc-
13 We are not aware of such major events. The Euro began circulating in 2001, but it was adopted in 1999. The
convergence of interest rates had started much earlier and was essentially completed by 2000-2001.
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tural parameter of interest, ρ . We measure τt as explained in Section 3.2, and we assume that the
tax change is not anticipated.14
The intermediate results are reported in Table 4. Column 1 is the baseline specification, and
the remaining 4 columns report the results of robustness checks that are consistent with the model
structure: in column 2, the regression is weighted by city population; in column 3, Genoa and
Venice (the two cities for which the fit from the calibration exercise is poor, see Figure 2) are
excluded; in column 4, a deterministic, quadratic time trend is included; in column 5, the time trend
is modeled as a fourth-order polynomial in time. Our point estimate of the composite parameter
βρ(1− δ ) ranges between 0.751 and 0.921 across these different specifications, with a small
standard error. It is remarkable that in specification 5 the tax change keeps its explanatory power
even after superimposing a quartic trend that absorbs a lot of variation in the price series, as the
large increase in R2 shows.
In order to back out ρ , we need values for the annual discount factor and depreciation rate.
Consistent with the calibration exercise, we set β = 0.96; as for δ , we let this parameter take three
possible values: 1%, 2%, and 3%. The resulting estimate of ρ is at the annual frequencies, and
so it needs to be rescaled at the generational frequencies to be interpretable within the model, as
discussed in Section 2.1. Denoting the estimate at the annual frequency by ρA and the estimate
at the generational frequency by ρG, rescaling simply takes the form ρG = 0.9630ρA, because 30
years is the distance between period 2 of generation j (when a donation takes place) and the active
life span (periods 1 and 2) of generation j+1 (when the donation produces utility to the receiver).
The resulting estimates of the intergenerational altruism parameter at the generational frequency
are reported in Table 5 for the largest and the smallest point estimates of the composite parameter,
and range between 0.22 and 0.28.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have exploited a reform of bequest taxation in Italy to identify the degree of in-
tergenerational altruism in a standard OLG framework with imperfect altruism as the only bequest
motive. This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper that provides a direct, structural
estimate of such a parameter by means of an exogenous variation in bequest taxation. Our direct
14 Insofar as it is partly anticipated (as the evidence in Bellettini, Taddei, and Zanella, 2013, suggests), our estimate
of ρ should be interpreted as a lower bound for the degree of intergenerational altruism. If the reform is anticipated
then the reform-induced change in prices from just before to just after the reform would be smaller than the overall
reform-induced price change: anticipation would cause the observed and the counterfactual price series to diverge
before the reform is implemented, thus leading to underestimation of the causal effect of the tax change on house
prices, and so to underestimation of ρ .
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Table 4: Estimation of the model’s structure
1 2 3 4 5
βρ(1−δ ) 0.921** 0.910** 0.916** 0.910** 0.751**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.037) (0.096)
Constant 0.041 0.210 0.138 0.227 1.235**
(0.138) (0.139) (0.091) (0.427) (0.399)
Observations 156 156 132 156 156
Adjusted R2 0.13 0.05 0.16 0.80 0.97
Cities 13 13 11 13 13
Population-weighted No Yes No No No
Additional time-trend No No No Quadratic Quartic
Notes: Nonlinear Least Squares estimates of composite structural parameter βρ(1− δ ). The dependent variable is
ln pitHit/c1,it . Column 1 reports the baseline estimate; in column 2, the regression is weighted by city population;
in column 3 we exclude Genoa and Venice, for which the fit from the calibration exercise is poor (see Figure 3); in
column 4 we include a deterministic quadratic time trend; in column 5 the trend is a quartic function of time. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses, and are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation at the city level. Statistical
significance: * 5%, ** 1% or better
Table 5: Estimates of the intergenerational parameter ρ
Parameter Freq. βρ(1−δ ) = 0.751 βρ(1−δ ) = 0.921
δ 1 year 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03
ρ 1 year 0.775 0.767 0.759 0.950 0.940 0.931
(s.e.) (0.099) (0.098) (0.097) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
ρ 30 years 0.228 0.225 0.223 0.279 0.276 0.274
(s.e.) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Notes: Estimates of the intergenerational altruism parameter, ρ , at the annual and generational frequency. For given
values of δ , the former is estimated as ρA = ̂βρ(1−δ )/β (1− δ ), where ̂βρ(1−δ ) is the baseline NLS estimate
reported in Table 4. The latter, instead, is computed as β 30ρA. Standard errors are computed using the delta method.
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estimate for Italy of between 0.22 and 0.28 is consistent with existing indirect ones for the US. This
suggests that intergenerational altruism may be quite uniform across advanced economies. From a
methodological viewpoint, we regard our contribution as an illustration of how one can fruitfully
combine different empirical approaches (reduced-form analysis of quasi-experiments, structural
methods, and calibration methods) to produce credible empirical evidence from tax reforms that
is relevant for both theory and policy. Unanticipated tax reforms such as the one that we exploit
are as uncommon as valuable. Poterba (2001) was already suggesting the need to use “sources of
plausibly exogenous variation in the tax rates” to study the elasticity of gift-giving. This paper is
the first contribution to follow up on this suggestion in estimating one of the crucial determinants
of gift-giving: intergenerational altruism.
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